66. How do we know if Telauges was not superior in character to Socrates？ for it is not enough that Socrates dies a more noble death， and disputed more skilfully with the sophists， and passed the night in the cold with more endurance， and that when he was bid to arrest Leon of Salamis， he considered it more noble to refuse， and that he walked in a swaggering way in the streets-though as to this fact one may have great doubts if it was true. But we ought to inquire， what kind of a soul it was that Socrates possessed， and if he was able to be content with being just towards men and pious towards the gods， neither idly vexed on account of men’s villainy， nor yet making himself a slave to any man’s ignorance， nor receiving as strange anything that fell to his share out of the universal， nor enduring it as intolerable， nor allowing his understanding to sympathize with the affects of the miserable flesh.
67. Nature has not so mingled [the intelligence] with the composition of the body， as not to have allowed thee the power of circumscribing thyself and of bringing under subjection to thyself all that is thy own； for it is very possible to be a divine man and to be recognized as such by no one. Always bear this in mind； and another thing too， that very little indeed is necessary for living a happy life. And because thou hast despaired of becoming a dialectician and skilled in the knowledge of nature， do not for this reason renounce the hope of being both free and modest and social and obedient to God.
68. It is in thy power to live free from all compulsion in the greatest tranquillity of mind， even if all the world cry out against thee as much as they choose， and even if wild beasts tear in pieces the members of this kneaded matter which has grown around thee. For what hinders the mind in the midst of all this from maintaining itself in tranquillity， and in a just judgment of all surrounding things， and in a ready use of the objects which are presented to it， so that the judgment may say to the thing which falls under its observation： This thou art in substance [reality]， though in men’s opinion thou mayest appear to be of a different kind； and the use shall say to that which falls under the hand： Thou art the thing that I was seeking； for to me that which presents itself is always a material for virtue， both rational and political， and， in a word， for the exercise of art， which belongs to man or God. For everything which happens has a relationship either to God or man， and is neither new nor difficult to handle， but usual and apt matter to work on.
69. The perfection of moral character consists in this， in passing every day as the last， and in being neither violently excited， nor torpid， nor playing the hypocrite.
70. The gods who are immortal are not vexed because during so long a time they must tolerate continually men such as they are and so many of them bad； and besides this， they also take care of them in all ways. But thou， who art destined to end so soon， art thou wearied of enduring the bad， and this too when thou art one of them？
71. It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly from his own badness， which is indeed possible， but to fly from other men’s badness， which is impossible.
72. Whatever the rational and political [social] faculty finds to be neither intelligent nor social， it properly judges to be inferior to itself.
73. When thou hast done a good act and another has received it， why dost thou still look for a third thing besides these， as fools do， either to have the reputation of having done a good act or to obtain a return？
74. No man is tired of receiving what is useful. But it is useful to act according to nature. Do not then be tired of receiving what is useful by doing it to others.
75. The nature of the All moved to make the universe. But now either everything that takes place comes by way of consequence or [continuity]； or even the chief things towards which the ruling power of the universe directs its own movement are governed by no rational principle. If this is remembered it will make thee more tranquil in many things （vi. 44； ix. 28）.
