Soc. Then he who is punished suffers what is good?
Pol. That is true.
Soc. Then he is benefited?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term "benefited"? I mean, that if he be justly punished his soul is improved.
Pol. Surely.
Soc. Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at the matter in this way:-In respect of a man's estate, do you see any greater evil than poverty?
Pol. There is no greater evil.
Soc. Again, in a man's bodily frame, you would say that the evil is weakness and disease and deformity?
Pol. I should.
Soc. And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil of her own?
Pol. Of course.
Soc. And this you would call injustice and ignorance and cowardice, and the like?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have pointed out three corresponding evils-injustice, disease, poverty?
Pol. True.
Soc. And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?-Is not the most disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul?
Pol. By far the most.
Soc. And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst?
Pol. What do you mean, Socrates?
Soc. I mean to say, that is most disgraceful has been already admitted to be most painful or hurtful, or both.
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by to be most disgraceful?
Pol. It has been admitted.
Soc. And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing excessive pain, or most hurtful, or both?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and ignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick?
Pol. Nay, Socrates; the painfulness does not appear to me to follow from your premises.
Soc. Then, if, as you would argue, not more painful, the evil of the soul is of all evils the most disgraceful; and the excess of disgrace must be caused by some preternatural greatness, or extraordinary hurtfulness of the evil.
Pol. Clearly.
Soc. And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the greatest of evils?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity of the soul, are the greatest of evils!
Pol. That is evident.
Soc. Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does not the art of ****** money?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of medicine?
Pol. Very true.
Soc. And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to answer at once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom we take them.
Pol. To the physicians, Socrates.
Soc. And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate?
Pol. To the judges, you mean.
Soc. -Who are to punish them?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in accordance with a certain rule of justice?
Pol. Clearly.
Soc. Then the art of money-****** frees a man from poverty; medicine from disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice?
Pol. That is evident.
Soc. Which, then, is the best of these three?
Pol. Will you enumerate them?
Soc. Money-******, medicine, and justice.
Pol. Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others.
Soc. And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or advantage or both?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who are being healed pleased?
Pol. I think not.
Soc. A useful thing, then?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil; and this is the advantage of enduring the pain-that you get well?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who is healed, or who never was out of health?
Pol. Clearly he who was never out of health.
Soc. Yes; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered from evils, but in never having had them.
Pol. True.
Soc. And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in their bodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, and another is not healed, but retains the evil-which of them is the most miserable?
Pol. Clearly he who is not healed.
Soc. And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from the greatest of evils, which is vice?
Pol. True.
Soc. And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the medicine of our vice?
Pol. True.
Soc. He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who has never had vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the greatest of evils.
Pol. Clearly.
Soc. And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice?
Pol. True.
Soc. That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and punishment?
Pol. Yes.
Soc. Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no deliverance from injustice?
Pol. Certainly.
Soc. That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes, and who, being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or correction or punishment; and this, as you say, has been accomplished by Archelaus and other tyrants and rhetoricians and potentates?
Pol. True.
Soc. May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to the conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and yet contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins against his constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a child, he is afraid of the pain of being burned or cut:-Is not that a parallel case?
Pol. Yes, truly.
