Property rights: and resource allocation, 4, 50; transferability of, 7, 115-17; in prereform land law, 10, 15; and constraint in theory of share tenancy, 16; and ranking of different contractual arrangements, 31, 33, 46, 158, 160; and constraint in contractual choice, 85; attenuation of, 89, 115-17; and analysis of rental share restriction, 115-17; exclusivity of, 115-17; production theorem of assignment, 117; and economic efficiency, 159; and agrarian reforms, 161
Purchase of land by tenants, 120
Rate of planting, 132-33
Regulations governing the lease of private farm lands in Taiwan Province, 1949: See Rental share restriction; Taiwan land reform
Relaying, 145-46
Rent: maximization of, 20; as a cost of production, 24, 42; when is land commonly owned, 117. See also Rental percentage
Rental annuity: maximized in share contract, 23-24; defined, 24n
Rental percentage: as variable determined in a share contract, 16-28, 53; in France and England, 35, 36; variation in, 56-58, 171-73; in share and fixed-rent contracts, 60, 171-73; of cash and crop rents in fixed-rent contract, 76; for different crops, 77-78
Rental share restriction: effects of on contractual arrangements, 88-99; and attenuation of land rights, 89; and sale of land, 98, 120; number of farms affected by, 99; effect of on landowner's income, 107n, 114; aims of, 113-14; effect of on resource allocation, 118, 132, 15657; and tenant income, 125n; in different prefectures, 139-42
Rent disputes: and choice of lease duration, 83-85; under Taiwan land reform, 96-97
Repossession of land, 102, 120
Residual: in tax-equivalent approach, 44; under rental share restriction, 108-9; under common resource ownership, 115-17
Resource allocation: with transaction costs, 66; contractually determined, 84; and increased farming intensity 108, 151; misallocation due to attenuation of rights, 116; effect of share restrictions on, 118, 132, 156-57; in feudal Europe and Tokugawa Japan, 161. See also Contractual arrangements; Contractual terms; Efficiency
Rice: crop area of under share restriction, 132; and output response, 135-39
Risk: and contractual choice, 63-87; natural risk defined, 63; risk aversion, 63, 68, 159; share contract a device for risk dispersion, 68-71; risk-exchange models, 68n; and fermiers, 70n; and escape clauses, 74-76; and price of land, 90, 98"Rock-bottom" subsistence theory, 165-66
Rotation, and crop area, 132, 146. See also Rate of planting
Schickele, Rainer, 47-48
Share contract: exploitation of, 8, 113; frequency of in Asian agriculture, 10, 66; and property rights, 16-28, 30-31; compared with fixed rent, 27; and custom, 39-48; under state ownership, 54n; transaction costs of, 67; as alternative to multiple escape clauses, 74-75; samples of, 76-79; short duration, 84; in other industries, 161. See also Contractual arrangements; Share tenancy
Share restriction. See Rental share restriction
Share tenancy: defined, 3; inefficiency of, 3, 7-8, 30, 126, 159; theory of resource allocation derived, 16-29; J. L. Buck on, 29, 78; in England, 32, 34; classical view of, 32-42; Neoclassical view of, 42-51; and tax-equivalent approach, 51-55; criticized by Chinese writers, 55; and tests of implications of alternative theories, 55-61; in Asia, 66-67. See also Share contract
Shirking of labor, 67
Short-term lease: inefficiency of, 8, 26n, 80; choice of, 83-85; frequency of, 84n
Sinchu, 141, 142n, 143
Single cropping, 136-37
Sino-Japanese War, 55, 73
Sismondi, J. C. L. Simonde de: on metayage in Italy, 38; on rental percentage, 40-41
Smith, Adam: on tax-equivalent approach, 32-34; on land tenure arrangements, 46
Soil space, 146
Special crops: listed, 131n; under share restriction, 132, 136n
State ownership of land: and equilibrium condition, 54n; in Taiwan, 122, 161
Stigler, George J., 42n"Surface," right to, 82-83
Taichung, 141, 142n, 150
Tainan, 141, 142n
Taipei, 141, 142n, 150
Taitung, 141, 142n
Taiwan Agricultural Yearbook, 129n
Taiwan land reform, 88, 91-92, 160; terms of, 5-6; intentions and justifications of, 7; timing of, 8n; and paddy and dry fields, 57; tenure rearrangements under, 90-91; restrictions on tenure rearrangements under, 93-95; and illegal tenure rearrangements, 95-98; enforcement of, 95, 99, 110, 114; effect on land prices, 98; percentage, not absolute restriction, 109-15; attenuation of of resource rights, 115-17; misallo-cation effects, 116, 156-57, 160; and "dual economy," 169 Taiwan Sugar Corporation, 145 Tax: misallocation effects, 115n Tax-equivalent approach: analysis of share contract under, 30, 39, 42-51, 159, 172; inefficiency of, 42-51; compared with standard theory of share tenancy, 51-55; tests of implications, 58-61 Tenure rearrangements, 90-91, 160 Transaction cost: prevents dispersion of tenant inputs, 55; and contractual arrangements, 63-87; and portfolio selection, 63n; and efficient allocation of resources, 64-66; effect of legal arrangements on, 66, 86-87; and ranking of contracts, 67-68, 78; and escape clauses, 75; and lease duration, 81-85; and used asset prices, 82; and intensity of resource use, 86 Transactions, 85 Transferability of rights: partial transfer, 62-63, 85; under Land-to-the-Tiller Act, 7, 113; under prereform land law, 11-15; outright transfer and owner production, 11, 63; and exclusivity in use, 46n, 115; ensures utilization of knowledge, 64; reduces enforcement costs, 64, 81; and maximum value of resource, 115
Underdevelopment, literature on, 49, 160-61. See also Dual economy; Disguised unemployment
United States, and Asian land reforms, 9
Variable proportions, law of, 54n, 105 Vegetables, 132, 136n, 149-54, 167 Vietnam, 61n
Wage contracts: frequency of in Asian agriculture, 66; transaction cost of, 67. See also Contractual arrangements
Water fees, 96
Watermelon, 146
Weather: as exogenous variable, 68; in Taiwan, 137
Yields: on tenant and owner farms, 59; and marginal product of farming inputs, 129-39; effect of increased density and rate of rotation on, 133; of rice, 137-39; maximization of, 142; of citronella, 143; of interplanting crops, 146, 149n; of vegetables, 150
Young, Arthur, 34-36
Yungtien, 11
